Abstract: Quantum secure direct communication protocols offer confidential transmission of classic information over the quantum channel without a prior key agreement. The ping-pong based protocols provide asymptotic security and detailed analysis of the security level provided by each variant of the protocol is required. The paper presents a general method of calculation of the eavesdropped information as a function of the attack detection probability. The method is applied to the ping-pong protocol based on completely entangled pairs of qudits. The lower and upper bound on the amount of the leaked information is provided.
Introduction
Quantum cryptography is extensively developed since the seminal paper of Bennet and Brassard [1] . The interest in this area is motivated by the promise of provable security based on the laws of physics. The first protocols [1, 2] addressed the problem of quantum key distribution (QKD). They are supposed to fill in the gap which appeared after the publication of the Shor's algorithm [3] , which is able to break Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (RSA) [4] cryptosystem in polynomial time [5, 6] . However, the information resulting from QKD execution is not determined by either of parties but is settled by the protocol completion itself. Thus QKD protocols cannot be used directly for the exchange of deterministic information. Moreover, quantum communication must be assisted by classic algorithms of privacy amplification which diminish the eavesdropper knowledge about the key under agreement. In effect the information throughput in QKD protocols is low.
Quantum secure deterministic communication (QSDC) protocols are designed for transfer of deterministic classic information over the quantum channel. They provide unidirectional communication in which information content is specified by the sender. Similarly to QKD, QSDC protocols offer asymptotic security in that sense, that there exists a finite probability that the eavesdropper can successfully intercept some part of the message without being detected. The protocol design should provide the possibly low probability of non-detection and the eavesdropper's information gain.
The first QSDC protocol, based on a single photon transmission, was proposed by Beige et. al. [7] . Later, Boström et. al. [8] proposed the ping-pong protocol based on EPR pairs. Since then many enhancements and modifications of the ping-pong protocol paradigm have been published including the superdense coding [9] , the usage of GHZ states for two [10] and multiparty [11] communication, and variants based on higher dimensional systems i.e. qutrits [12, 13] and qudits [14] . The original protocol is provably secure in case of a perfect quantum channel [8] , and although it has been successfully attacked in presence of a noise [15, 16] , there exist simple countermeasures that restore its security [17] . The security of the ping-pong protocol based on GHZ states [18] and qutrits [19] also has been studied. It has been shown that their security properties are very similar to the original version although multiparty variants are vulnerable to double CNOT attack [20] .
Although the version of the ping-pong protocol based on pairs of maximally entangled qudits is relatively old, its security has not been analyzed [21] in depth. The aim of this paper is to fill in this gap. The approach presented here is a generalization of the methods presented in [8, 19] . It is applied to the protocol variant with superdense coding and the eavesdropping detection performed in the computational base. The analysis of the protocol in which the eavesdropper detection is performed in mutually unbiased bases [22] is left for the future work.
The ping-pong protocol in short
In the provided protocol description Alice and Bob are legitimate parties while Eve is a malicious eavesdropper. The ping-pong protocol operates in two modes. In the message mode Alice sends information to Bob, while in the control mode the communicating parties check for presence of an eavesdropper. The operation is started by Bob, the recipient of information, who prepares two maximally entangled qudits. Without loss of generality it may be assumed that it is in the state [23] 
One of the qudits, denoted as "home", is kept confidential, while the the second one, named the "travel", is sent to Alice. Alice randomly selects either the message mode or the control mode. In the message mode she applies one of the unitary transformations to the travel qudit [24, 25] 
where summation within kets is performed (modN ) and α, β = 0, . . . , N − 1. The message is encoded in α and β so Alice can encode 2 log 2 (N ) bits per one protocol cycle. The entanglement of qudits causes that Alice's local operations have non local effects. The state composed from home and travel qudits is transformed into another maximally entangled state |ψ α,β . Next, the transformed qudit is sent back to Bob, who a performs collective measurement on both qudits. There exists one-to-one correspondence between the state detected by Bob and the values of α and β, so Bob can decode information sent by Alice. However, such a scheme can be attacked by eavesdropping Eve. Although the travel qudit looks for her as maximally mixed, she can attach, according to the dilation theorem [26] , an ancilla system of dimension N 2 that purifies the travel qudit. She can then entangle the travel qudit with the ancilla by some unitary operation E. Because of the introduced entanglement the encoding operations U α,β also transform the ancilla system. Then Eve can infer some information about Alice encoding by measuring the travel qudit and the ancilla. However, Eve's eavesdropping introduces transmission errors as a side effect, which are perceived by Alice and Bob as a noise. Thus Alice and Bob have to take additional countermeasures to detect Eve's operations.
The special control mode is used for the eavesdropping detection. Alice switches to the control mode in some randomly selected protocol cycles. In this mode she measures the received travel qudit. The fact of switching into control mode is then announced via the public classic channel. It is assumed that although public information is accessible to Eve, she can't control its content. Bob subsequently measures the home qudit in the same base and asks Alice to reveal the value of her measurement. Because of the fragile entanglement of the two-qudit system the result of Bob's measurement is fully determined by the value obtained by Alice. Any deviation from that correlation indicates the presence of Eve.
Security analysis
Eve observes the travel qudit as a maximally mixed state
where the subscript "t" has been omitted as further only the travel qudit will be considered. The best she can do is to entangle the qudit with the ancilla system and infer some information about encoding transformation from the measurement of the accessible part of the resulting quantum system. However, any mixed state in the the space of dim (H) may be treated as the partial trace of the pure state living in the space with attached ancilla of size dim (H E ) ≤ (dim (H)) 2 . The entanglement operation is unitary and may be described as
where |x and |x denote the state of the travel qudit before and after transformation. Similarly, |φ and |φ x,l denote the states of the ancilla. There exist exactly N such states for each x so Eve has to use N 2 probes. The state of the travel qudit and the attached ancilla after Alice's encoding operation takes the form
Lets us assume that encoding operations used by Alice are equally probable and consider the attack on state x = 0. The resulting density matrix has the form
exp 2πi
There exist N 2 base vectors |k + β |φ 0,k , but fixing β selects the subspace spanned by N vectors. It follows that density matrix of size N 2 × N 2 may be factorized into N identical 1 submatrices of size N × N . Moreover, each of those matrices is diagonal
The maximal mutual information I A,E between Alice and Eve is limited by the Holevo bound
where S (ρ) denotes the von Neumann entropy of the system described by the density matrix ρ. But, by the assumption about the construction of the ancilla system, the states |ψ
α,β are pure and S |ψ
However, each eigenvalue is N -fold degenerate and 
and non-detection probability equals to p
The states |x looks for Eve as maximally mixed ensemble and total information equals to
Similarly the non-detection probability should be averaged on the ensemble
The above equations represent opposed interests of the Eve: she has to choose the attack operation such that p nd is kept possibly small while the mutual information I A,E is maximized.
Results
A Monte-Carlo analysis of the protocol security was performed. For a set of randomly selected attack operations intercepted information and a non-detection probability were computed using (13) and (14) . The considered operations are represented as points on Fig. 1 . on results for the qudit dimension N = 3, 4, 5 are plotted.
But before delving into the analysis of the numerical results it is helpful to consider two canonical attack operations. Let us suppose that Eve is able to construct the unitary transformation such that
where p nd represents the non-detection probability. In this case the mutual information between Alice and Eve equals to
In the second scenario let the detection probability will be equally spread over all probe states
In such a situation I max
The curves (16) and (18) are also shown on Fig. 1 . It is immediately visible that they represent lower and upper bound of information accessible to the eavesdropper. The maximal information available to Eve is equal to the channel capacity 2 log 2 N . Moreover, for larger N the attack providing maximal possible information is detected with higher probability. If Eve implements attacks that are harder to detect then mutual information is diminished. In the limiting case when Eve is totally hidden (p nd = 1) she has knowledge about half of the transmission content. It is also visible that randomly selected attack transformations are concentrated around the point in which Eve gets most information but is easily detected. The results presented herein are in the perfect agreement with the analysis of the qutrit based protocol presented in [19] . It immediately follows that all qudit based ping-pong protocols that use the superdense coding and the eavesdropping detection only in the computational base are not secure. Eve intercepts at least a half of the message content and in such conditions even privacy amplification cannot restore protocol security. It is also worth noting that the usage of privacy amplification together with the QSDC protocols is unreasonable as the latter ones were devised to avoid necessity of such postprocessing.
Conclusion
The numerical experiments and theoretical analysis reveal a tradeoff between the eavesdropper detectability and the information leakage. The maximal amount of information obtained by the eavesdropper is equal to the total channel capacity. However, as the number of states of the signal particle gets larger, the probability of non-detection is diminished. Moreover, the control mode using only the computational base is not sufficient, as in this case Eve can intercept a half of the message and stay undetected.
The examination of the eavesdropper detection based on mutually unbiased bases will be the subject of future research. Fortunately, the proposed general approach to the security analysis of the ping-pong protocols also may be used in such a case. The presented method can be applied not only to variants when one qudit particle is used for signaling, but also, almost without any modifications, it can be applied to analyze protocols based on multiple qubits and GHZ states. Thus it seems to be very fruitful, as the QSDC protocols are one of the most actively developed branches of quantum cryptography. Moreover, protocols conforming to the ping-pong paradigm, in which signal particle travels forth and back between the recipient and the sender of information, are the most popular [27] .
Protokoły QSDC oferują bezpieczeństwo asymptotyczne, w tym sensie,że istnieje niezerowe prawdopodobieństwo nie wykrycia napastnika mimo iż uzyska on dostęp do części przesyłanej informacji. Dlatego też istotne jest systematyczne przebadanie właś-ciwości protokołów QSDC w tym zakresie. Jak dotąd do badania protokołów stosowano metody wykorzystujące ich szczególne właściwości i dopiero w pracach [18, 19] dokonano tego w sposób systematyczny dla par qutritów oraz stanów GHZ.
Mimo,że wersja protokołu ping-pong dla par maksymalnie splątanych quditów jest stosunkowo stara [21] to nie doczekała się systematycznej analizy pod kątem poziomu zapewnianej ochrony. W niniejszym artykule zaproponowano uogólnienie podejścia zaproponowanego w [8, 19] i zastosowano je do wspomnianego wyżej wariantu protokołu. W pracy przedstawiono wyniki obliczeń numerycznych oraz zaproponowano wyrażenia na kres dolny i górny informacji uzyskanej przez napastnika, przy czym wartości kresów zależne są od prawdopodobieństwa wykrycia podsłuchu. Z przedstawionych rezultatów wynika,że napastnik może uzyskać dostęp do log 2 N bitów informacji, co stanowi połowę pojemości kanału, a w szczególnym przypadku może przejąć całość transmisji, jednak wiedza ta okupiona jest stosunkowo dużym prawdpodobieństwem wykrycia jego obecności (p = (N − 1)/N ). Wświetle zaprezentowanych wyników odmiany protokołu ping-pong wykorzystujące supergęste kodowanie i wykrywanie podsłuchu tylko w bazie pomiarowej należy uznać za mało bezpieczne. Zaproponowana metoda analizy może być również zastosowana, praktycznie bezżadnych modyfikacji, do badania protokołów wykorzystujących stany splątane GHZ.
